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2cnd International Workshop on Human Factors
In Offshore Operations. April 8-10, Houston.

Analysis of Human Factors
Related Accidents and Near
Misses
James Reason
Emeritus Professor
University of Manchester, UK

Two kinds of bad event
• Individual accidents: high frequency/low
severity events—slips, trips, falls, bangs and
knocks usually resulting in a few days
absence from work (lost time injuries).

• Organizational accidents: low
frequency/high severity events—explosions,
collisions, collapses, releases of toxic
substances, etc. Is system vulnerability
adequately assessed by LTIs? NO!

Two ways of looking at human
factors problems
• The PERSON approach
• The SYSTEM approach

Individual & organizational ax
have different causal sets
Individual
accidents OrgAx

Failure of limited
personal protection
against injury
(Person model)

Arise from linked
failures of multiple
system defences
(System model)

Common ground:
Inadequate resources
Poor safety culture
Commercial pressures

The ‘Swiss cheese’ model
of accident causation
Some holes due
to active failures

Losses

Hazards

Other holes due to
latent conditions
(resident ‘pathogens’)

Successive layers of defences, barriers, & safeguards

How and why defenses fail
Defenses

HOW?

Losses

Hazards
Latent
condition
pathways

WHY?

Causes
Unsafe acts

Local workplace factors
Organizational factors

Investigation

Matrix for defensive failures
MODE
FUNCTION
Awareness
Detection
Warning
Protection
Recovery
Containment
Escape

Engineered Standards Procedures Training Personal
safety
policies Instruction briefings protective
features
equipment
controls Supervision drills

Piper Alpha: Defensive failures
MODE
FUNCTION
Awareness
Detection
Warning
Protection
Recovery
Containment
Escape

Engineered Standards Procedures Training Personal
safety
policies Instruction briefings protective
features
equipment
controls Supervision drills

Unsafe acts
•
•
•
•

Slips, lapses, trips and fumbles
Rule-based mistakes
Knowledge-based mistakes
Violations
 Routine
 Optimising
 Situational

Rule-related behaviours
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Correct compliance
Mistaken compliance (mispliance)
Malicious compliance (malpliance)
Mistaken circumvention (misvention)
Successful violation
Mistaken improvisation
Correct improvisation

Workplace factors
• Error factors









Change of routine
Poor interface
Ambiguity
Educational mismatch
Negative transfer
Poor S:N ratio
Inadequate tools
Etc.

• Violation factors









Violations condoned
Equipment problems
Time pressure
Unworkable procedures
Supervisory example
Easier way of working
Poor tasking
Etc.

Organizational factors
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Training
Tools & equipment
Materials
Design
Communication
Procedures
Pressures

•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Maintenance
Planning
Managing operations
Managing safety
Managing change
Budgeting
Inspecting, etc.

Accident investigation steps
•
•
•
•
•

What defenses failed (mode/function)?
How did each defense fail?
Were there contributing unsafe acts?
Workplace factors for each unsafe act?
Organizational factors (latent conditions)
contributing to defensive failures and
workplace factors?

System contributions

(Single or multiple events)
Organizational factors
Failed
defenses

Workplace
factors

Latent condition profile

Aims of HF event analysis
•
•
•
•

Identify recurrent error traps
Identify how and why defenses fail
Identify upstream ‘pathogens’
Rectify systemic weaknesses

TAKE HOME MESSAGE: YOU CAN’T CHANGE
THE HUMAN CONDITION, BUT YOU CAN
CHANGE WORKING CONDITIONS.

